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We use aggregated and anonymized information based on international ex-
penditures through corporate payment cards to map the network of global
business travel. We combine this network with information on the industrial
composition and export baskets of national economies. The business travel
network helps predict which economic activities will grow in a country, which
new activities will develop and which old activities will be abandoned. In sta-
tistical terms, business travel has the most significant impact among a range of
bilateral relations between countries, such as trade, foreign direct investments
and migration. Moreover, our analysis suggests that this impact is causal:
business travel from countries specializing in a specific industry causes growth
in that economic activity in the destination country. Our interpretation of this
is that business travel helps diffuse knowledge and we use our estimates to as-
sess which countries contribute or benefit most from the knowledge diffusion
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through global business travel.
Introduction
Globalization has led to a tremendous increase in international business travel. Its growth has
outstripped the growth of the world economy by a wide margin: whereas nominal, USD de-
nominated, global GDP has risen by 0.7% per year between 2011 and 2016 (World Bank data),
our data suggest that nominal expenditures related to business travel have grown at an annu-
alized rate of 8.3% over the same period (see Methods section). This growth coincides with
tremendous improvements in the availability, quality and costs of long-distance communica-
tion technologies. From conference calls to online collaboration platforms, new technologies
have made it easier for businesses to connect across the globe without the need for costly and
time-consuming travel. So why do we still need to travel so much? What is it that face-to-face
interaction on business trips can achieve that other means of communication cannot?
Business scholars have argued that, without face-to-face communication, some knowledge
is hard to transmit (1). Accordingly, one can think of knowledge as consisting of three com-
ponents. The first component is knowledge that is codified in production recipes, algorithms,
textbooks, blueprints and the like (2). This knowledge component consists of know-what and
know-why (3): knowledge about facts – e.g., the physical dimensions of a product – and about
well-understood causal mechanisms, like laws of physics. The second component consists of
knowledge that is embedded in physical artifacts, such as machines, tools or intermediate prod-
ucts (4). Nowadays, either component can be easily transferred: the costs and speed with
which machines, tools and semi-finished products can be shipped has never been lower and,
with internet-based technology, code and textbooks can be transmitted almost instantaneously
at high fidelity.
The third component of knowledge, however, is stickier. It consists of knowledge of how to
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expertly carry out certain tasks oneself or of where to find someone who possesses this knowl-
edge. The former is often referred to as know-how, the latter as know-who (3). This third
component of knowledge resides in people, teams of people and in the relations between these
teams (5). Large parts of such knowledge cannot be easily articulated by its carriers or would be
tremendously costly to codify (6), let alone transmitted in digital form. It has therefore been de-
scribed as tacit (7). Although tacit knowledge is typically associated with physical and artisanal
skills, sociologists of science have shown that tacit knowledge also plays an important role in
science and technology (8,9). Moreover, its transfer, which is indispensal in the training of sci-
entists and engineers, typically involves repeated interaction, imitation and on-the-job training
and is often organized in an apprenticeship-like relation between the experienced scientist and
her trainee, as evident in common practice in doctoral training programs and artfully illustrated
by MacKenzie and Spinardi’s (10) case study on nuclear weapons design.
Given that in modern economies, knowledge about even the most mundane production tech-
nologies is too complex for any single individual to comprehend in full, know-how often needs
to be complemented by know-who: knowledge of how and where to access experts in a field.
Know-who is particularly important in inter-firm relations, as it helps identify and forge al-
liances with customers and suppliers (11). Like know-how, know-who tends to be more tacit,
embedded in people’s understanding of the social network that surrounds them and where in
this network reliable and trustworthy expertise can be tapped.
In light of this, one plausible explanation for why business travel has not only endured, but
expanded, in spite of the increasing availability of substitutes in the form of new communica-
tion technologies is that these new technologies are still inadequate when it comes to transmit-
ting tacit know-how or to establishing the trust-based relations associated with know-who. By
temporarily relocating know-how through moving the individuals that carry it, business travel
enables face-to-face contacts through which tacit know-how can diffuse and trust and social
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networks can develop.
In this paper, we map the pattern of global business travel and explore how it affects the
growth of economic activity. Our underlying hypothesis is that business travel enables the
diffusion of know-how and know-who across countries. It is therewith related to prior work
that has used business travel as an explanation for bilateral trade links (12) (and in Poole’s
2010 “Business travel as an input to international trade”), innovation (13), and increases in
productivity (14).
Our hypothesis is that business travel helps to diffuse tacit knowledge. As pointed out by
Krugman (15), knowledge flows are notoriously hard to quantify: “Knowledge flows [...] are
invisible; they leave no paper trail by which they may be measured and tracked.” Subsequent
authors accepted the implicit challenge, uncovering the imprint that knowledge flows leave in
patent citations (16) or in academic collaborations (17). This work has shown that geographical
distance is still a formidable impediment to the flow of knowledge and that knowledge diffuses
first locally and only later across longer distances. Moreover, when knowledge diffuses spa-
tially, it does so primarily through the social networks of mobile skilled individuals (18, 19).
By analyzing patents and scientific publications, these studies focus on knowledge diffusion in
the exceptionally knowledge-intensive domains of innovation and scientific progress. However,
academic debates often operate at some distance from the economy and patents shed light on
only a subset of industries, mostly in the manufacturing sector. Moreover, patents and academic
publications mainly reflect codified knowledge, not the tacit know-how and know-who that we
hypothesize is transferred through business travel. Research efforts based on patents and scien-
tific publications are therefore constrained in their scope compared to the totality of the global
economy.
Yet, business travel flows are not necessarily a reflection of knowledge flows. The concern
that Krugman raised is still valid: by its very nature, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ob-
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serve tacit knowledge directly. However, its presence will be manifest in what an economy is
able to produce (20). Consequently, knowledge flows should reveal themselves in the way they
help economies grow and diversify. Therefore, instead of trying to measure knowledge flows
themselves, we use a strategy previously employed in (21) and look for indirect evidence for
the existence of these flows by studying how business travel relates to changes in the economic
structure of a country. In particular, if business travel helps transfer tacit know-how, we should
observe that countries grow in economic activities that coincide with the economic specializa-
tions of the places from which they receive business travelers.
To test this hypothesis, we use aggregated and anonymized data made accessible for the
duration of the research by the Mastercard Center for Inclusive Growth (“the Center”). These
data shed light on corporate credit or debit card (henceforth: “card” or “corporate card”) foreign
spend in business travel for the period 2011-2016.
Credit and other payment card data have previously been used to shed light on socioeco-
nomic phenomena (22–24). Typically, these studies are restricted to expenditures in a single
city or country. In contrast, the aggregated and anonymized data underlying our study relate to
foreign expenditures in 127 different countries.
Each observation in our data consists of the number of trips from a country of origin to a
country of destination in a given year. That is, it counts the unique number of cards that were
issued in the country of origin and that made payments in the country of destination. For the
purpose of this research we refer to these card counts as the number of “business travelers” –
which in no way relates to identifiable individuals. Because the only cards considered herein
are issued to a company or employer, foreign spend associated with them generally reflects
work-related travel. We use these data to derive a business travel network that connects 127
different countries. These travel flows turn out to be representative of aggregate and bilateral
flows recorded in official statistics (see Sec. S3).
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To infer the most likely industrial content of the know-how that is transmitted through this
network, we use information on the industrial composition of national economies. To avoid
contaminating the business travel information with priors taken from other sources, we apply
the principle of maximum ignorance and assume that business travelers are drawn at random
from the population of establishments in their country of origin. Subsequently, we use this
estimate to predict how national economies change their mix of economic activities: which
activities grow? which new activities emerge? and which old activities disappear? We find that
predictions based on business travel compare favorably to the ones based on alternative bilateral
relations between countries, such as migrant stocks, foreign direct investments (FDI), trade, and
similarities in countries’ histories, cultures or languages. More importantly, we use instrumental
variables estimation to show that the estimated effects of business travel on economic growth
can plausibly be considered causal.
Results
Mapping business travel
Expenditures related to international business travel have expanded markedly: according to our
data, the value of these expenditures rose by 47% between 2011 and 2016 and the number of
travelers went up by 38% over the same period. Among the fastest growing origins of busi-
ness travel were China and India; rapidly growing destinations are found in eastern Europe
and central America (see Methods section). In spite of the explosive growth in the volume of
business travel, its network structure has remained remarkably stable (see Sec. S4). To de-
termine this, for each year, we collect the number of business travelers between each country
of origin and each country of destination in yearly matrices, Bt, where rows represent origins
and columns destinations. The correlation of the log-transformed elements of these matrices
is ρ(9, 485) = 0.96 (p < 0.001, 95% Confidence Interval = [0.958-0.962]) when comparing
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consecutive years, (Bt, Bt+1), and still reaches ρ(9, 485) = 0.90 (p < 0.001, 95% Confidence
Interval = [0.896-0.904]) when comparing flows in 2011 to flows in 2016. To avoid observations
with log(0), we add 1 to each element before taking logs.
To minimize noise, we average the matrices across years into a matrix B̄. This business
travel matrix is sparse: 43% of its elements are equal to zero and 65% of all business travelers
can be accounted for by country pairs in the top 1% of bilateral flows. The sparse structure
suggests analyzing this matrix as a complex network (25, 26). To do so, we first extract a
noise-corrected backbone that retains only statistically significant links using (27). In practice,
this means that we only retain links with travel intensities that have a below 1% likelihood of
having emerged at random. The result is a business travel network that contains 667 of the
original 9,529 nonzero links, depicted in Fig. 1A.
The business travel network is far from homogeneous. Its edges can to some extent be
explained by a simple gravity model: countries are strongly connected if they are geographically
close and if they are large in terms of their Gross Domestic Products (GDP). In a simple log-
linear model, geographical distance and origin and destination GDP can together account for
more than half the variance in business travel flows (R2 = 60.7%, F-statistic (3,112) = 189.8,
p < 0.001). However, business travel is also associated with several bilateral relations between
countries. Fig. 1B reports the statistical association between the volume of business travel and
a variety of bilateral links between countries: foreign direct investment (FDI), cross-ownership
of corporations (equity links), trade, migration and sharing a colonial history. If we use all of
these covariates simultaneously in an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict business
travel, we obtain an R2 = 73.9% (F-statistic(9,112) = 304.9, p < 0.001) (Fig. 1C, see also Sec.
S4). Most of the variance in business travel is explained by equity and FDI relations (46.4%).
The remaining factors – including geography and GDP – explain 22.4% of the variation, with
26.1% left unexplained.
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The Travel Quantity Index
Our main question of interest is whether business travel can explain the growth of economic
activities in a country. To explore this, we need to assign business travelers to the industry they
are most likely to represent. We do this by decomposing the business travel flows that emanate
from a country into industry-specific subflows. Given that we have no information on the in-
dustry from which a flow originates, we apply the principle of maximum ignorance and assume
that any establishment in a country of origin is equally likely to dispatch a business traveler.
That is, we assume that a business traveler that is observed to travel from country o to country
d is equally likely to come from any of the establishments in country o. Consequently, the ex-
pected size of the business travel flow from a particular industry in a country is proportional to
the industry’s number of establishments in that country.
To be precise, consider an activity matrix, A, with elements Aci that record for each country
c ∈ C (be it origin or destination) – with C the set of countries in our dataset – the share of
establishments classified under industry i. For instance, in a stylized example where 50% of
Germany’s economic establishments produce cars, the corresponding entry in this matrix is 0.5.
Furthermore, consider a business travel matrix, B, with elements Bod that record the number of
business travelers from country of origin o that visit country of destination d. We now estimate
the number of business travelers from an industry i that visit country d by Qdi =
∑
o∈C
AoiBod.
In other words, we guess a traveler’s industrial origins by assuming that all establishments in o
are equally likely to have sent the traveler. We refer to the elements in matrix Q as the Travel
Quantity Index (TQI ).
Because we will assess how business travel relates to industrial growth between 2011 and
2016, we use the business travel matrix of the base year 2011. Moreover, we restrict industries
to industries that produce tradable products, which can export their products beyond the national
market, and drop natural-resource based industries (see Sec. S2). Both restrictions ensure that
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the industries we focus on are not limited in their location choice by the presence of natural
resources or of a large local market.
Fig. 2A illustrates this operation: the total flow of business travelers from a country of origin
(Germany or the US) to a country of destination (Austria, Italy or Portugal) in 2011 is split into
three industry-specific subflows – one for cars, one for chemicals and one for agriculture –
according to each industry’s share of establishments in the economy of the country of origin. In
our earlier example, if Germany sends six business travelers to Austria, three of them (6× 0.5)
are assumed to represent car manufacturers.
Note that this approach does not aim for the most accurate estimate of a business traveler’s
industry affiliation. In fact, we could improve our estimate by adding, for instance, industry-
specific information on FDI or trade flows. However, the resulting industry-specific business
travel flows would now mix information on business travel with information from these other
flows. This would make it impossible to unambiguously associate any subsequently estimated
parameters with business travel per se, as opposed to, in the examples above, FDI or trade.
The end result is an estimate of which countries will have access to which industries’ knowl-
edge bases. To illustrate this, Fig. 2B depicts the degree to which an industry is estimated to
be overexpressed in the incoming business travel flow of China, Mexico and Germany. China
is estimated to have easy access to manufacturing know-how, Mexico to know-how related to
business services and Germany to know-how of a more balanced array of industries.
The differences between these three countries are driven by the fact that China, Mexico
and Germany are connected to countries with vastly different industrial specialization patterns.
Take for instance the three most overexpressed industries in the business travel flows to China:
machinery for paper making, carbon paper and inked ribbons, and foreign bank branches. These
industries represent the top 3 economic activities in which the neighboring Republic of Korea
specializes. Likewise, Mexico’s top 3 can be explained by the specialization pattern of the
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US economy (ranks 1, 2 and 7), whereas Germany’s top 3 consists of the top specialization
of Poland, the Czech Republic and Denmark. To calculate how specialized a country is in an
industry we use the number of establishments in country c and industry i, Pic. To be precise,
we define the degree of specialization as:
Pic/
∑
i′∈I
Pi′c∑
c′
Pic′/
∑
i′′∈I,c′′∈C
Pi′′c′′
.
Does TQI contain information on international knowledge flows? To assess this, we exam-
ine whether these flows leave traces in the transformation of the industrial composition of the
recipient country’s economy. In particular, we explore if the TQI predicts how fast different
industries will grow in a country. In these analyses, we drop small countries with a population
below 2.5 million inhabitants from the data, leaving us with a sample of 96 countries. Results
for the full set of countries are shown in Sec. S6.
Tab. 1 reports outcomes of OLS regressions with different sets of control variables. Ob-
servations are composed of industry-country pairs. The first model shows the effect of only
business travel and a mean-reversion term. In the second model, we add variables that control
for the global size of the industry and the size and wealth of the country, all of which will affect
both, business travel flows and economic growth. In the third model, we replace these control
variables by industry and country fixed effects. These fixed effects will control nonparametri-
cally for any industry or country specific confounding factors.
In all regression models, a higher TQI is associated with a higher growth rate. Our preferred
model is model 3, which controls for any idiosyncrasies that affect growth rates at the level of
the country or of the industry. The point estimates can be interpreted as elasticities: in our
preferred model, a 10% increase in the number of incoming business travelers is associated
with a .6% (t-statistic(95) = 2.86, p = .005, effect size = 0.06, 95% Confidence Interval = [.02-
.10]) increase in an industry’s growth. Note that the estimates in Tab. 1 are limited to industries
that already existed in the country. However, in Sec. S6, we show that business travel is also
associated with increased entry rates of new industries.
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However, as shown in Fig. 1B, business travel is also correlated with a number of alternative
bilateral relations between countries. To assess the predictive performance of the TQI , relative
to these other relations, we construct a series of XQI indicators using a procedure identical
to the one that generated TQI , while replacing the business travel matrix, B, by matrices that
capture other bilateral relations. When estimating the effects of each indicator separately, TQI
features the highest estimated elasticity. When modeled jointly, the variables are too collinear
to allow for the inclusion of country and industry fixed effects. However, if we instead use
the specification of model 2 in Tab. 1, TQI remains statistically significant at p < .05 (t-
statistic(93) = 2.26, p = .025, effect size = 0.08, 95% Confidence Interval = [.01-.14]) and
outperforms all alternative indicators (Sec. S6).
Does the level of industrial aggregation matter? The models in Tab. 1 assume that there are
no spill-overs from business travel across industries. In other words, business travelers from a
narrowly defined industry such as “Envelopes” (SIC 2677) would only affect the growth rate
of, in this case, envelope-making, but not of the manufacturing of other stationary products. We
can relax this assumption by gradually aggregating industries into higher-level sectors, such that
the estimated coefficients internalize more of the potential spillovers between narrowly defined
industries. In Sec. S6.2, we show that, as the industry classification coarsens, the point estimates
for the effect of TQI become successively stronger. This supports the idea that knowledge that
is diffused by business travel may be shared beyond the narrowly defined industries of Tab. 1.
Finally, we test how robust our results are when describing national economies, not in terms
of the size of their industries, but in terms of the product-specific volumes of their exports. To
do so, we replace the data on economic establishments by data on global trade patterns (Sec.
S6.3). This exercise shows that TQI not only predicts the evolution of the industry mix of a
country’s economy, but also the change in the country’s export profile (p < 0.001). That is,
business travel associated with a certain export product predicts the emergence and growth of
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exports of this product in recipient countries.
Together, these analyses document a robust statistical association between business travel
and the transformation of a country’s economic activity mix. How should we interpret this
finding? It is important to note that the uncovered statistical associations do not necessarily
mean that business travel causes economic growth. For instance, business travel may be just one
among a number of other steps firms undertake to find new suppliers or to establish new branch
plants abroad. Moreover, economic growth itself may attract business travelers, suggesting that
the direction of causation may be reversed.
To probe into this question more deeply, we apply instrumental variables (IV) estimation.
Note that TQIid represents a weighted sum of industry i’s shares in the economies of origin
countries. It thus essentially represents the weighted size of the industry in the global economy,
where weights are given by origin countries’ business travel flow to the destination country, d.
Because business travel may both cause and be caused by the growth prospects of industry i
in the destination, these weights may be endogenous. Therefore, we instrument TQI , using
information on bilateral visa regimes. Given that visa-related travel restrictions only affect
the flow of people, this provides plausible exogenous variation in the business travel volume
between countries. A detailed description of the construction of these instruments can be found
in Sec. S7.
The IV regressions yield causal effects that are, if anything, even somewhat larger than the
effects derived from OLS regressions. However, it is unlikely that business travel is an ultimate
cause of growth: we would not expect that randomly dispatched business travelers would, by
themselves, spur much growth in recipient countries. Instead, business travel is more likely to
enable economic growth by facilitating other interactions between countries, such as FDI and
trade. In line with this, we find that business travel has a strong causal effect on the intensity
of bilateral FDI, equity and trade (see Sec. S7). In other words, trade and investment relations
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are typically accompanied by business travel (see Fig. 1B) and depend on it for their success.
This, in turn, suggests that international travel helps initiate or maintain such relations. Given
the substantial monetary and time expenditures associated with business travel, firms apparently
put a high value on the face-to-face interactions that travel buys them. In light of this, the causal
effect of business travel on the growth of economic activities related to such travel corroborates
our hypothesis that business travel helps transfer know-how and know-who. The mechanism
through which business travel achieves this is by enabling successful investment and trade links.
Know-how Index
How valuable is global business travel? To provide an estimate of this, we ask two questions.
First, how many jobs in a given economy can we attribute to incoming business travel? Second,
how much value do these jobs create?
To answer these questions, we will have to make some drastically simplifying assumptions.
First, we assume that the effects of business travel on job creation are causal. The IV models in
Sec. S7 warrant such an assumption. However, in this section we will use OLS estimates, which
are more precisely estimated – especially in the presence of country and industry fixed effects
– and more conservative than the IV estimates. To be precise, we will fit a regression model
that predicts the employment of each industry in a country. Next, using the fitted parameters
of this model, we estimate how much higher or lower the employment in an industry would
have been, had the country received some counterfactual number of business travelers. Second,
we use information on industry-differentials in establishments’ sales per worker as a proxy
for differentials in productivity per worker. Unfortunately, in our data set this information is
unreliably captured for establishments outside the US. Therefore, we proceed in two steps.
First, we estimate the average sales per worker in an industry using US figures only. Next, we
correct for productivity differences between the country and the US by multiplying this number
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by the ratio of the country’s GDP per capita to the US GDP per capita. A country’s predicted
output is now simply the predicted number of jobs in an industry, multiplied by the predicted
productivity of workers in these jobs, summed across all industries. Note that the accuracy of
this calculation will depend on the correlation between value added and sales in an industry and
on how similar the inter-industry productivity ratios in a country are to the ones observed in the
US.
We use this procedure to construct two indices. First, we predict a destination country’s
output, once with its current inflow of business travel and once with the expected inflow, had
business travel been distributed proportionally according to countries’ populations and indus-
tries’ global employment sizes. The ratio of these two predictions answers the question: How
much larger or smaller would a country’s economy have been, had it received its “fair share” of
business travel? We convert this into a percentage by subtracting 1 from the ratio and multiply-
ing the result by 100. We call the resulting quantity the Incoming Know-how Index (IKI ).
Second, for each country of origin, we compare the predicted size of the global economy
with and without the country’s business travelers. This tells us by how much we would pre-
dict the world economy to shrink, were a country to withdraw from global business travel and
stop sending travelers abroad. Once again, we convert the ratio of the two predictions into a
percentage and call the resulting quantity the Outgoing Know-how Index (OKI ). Details of the
calculations, as well as full rankings by country are provided in Sec. S7.
Fig. 3 plots the distribution of both indices across countries. The predicted benefits of
business travel (3A) are distributed unequally across the world. Moreover, they tend to favor
rich countries and their neighbors. This is unsurprising, given that business travel follows a
law of gravity: it tends to connect each country to nearby large economies. The origins of
global know-how flows are even more concentrated. They are dominated by a small number of
wealthy countries, like Germany, Canada, the US, the UK and the Republic of Korea. These
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countries not only send the largest number of business travelers abroad, they also tend to send
them from productive industries and to other advanced economies. As a result, they are not only
predicted to create a large number of jobs, but also jobs in highly productive activities and in
highly productive economies.
Fig. 4 illustrates this point by showing how predicted output losses associated with the with-
drawal of specific business travel origins are felt across the globe. The upper row compares the
withdrawal of Germany, the top contributor to OKI , to the withdrawal of the US. Whereas US
business travel concentrates in North and South America, German business travel is more spread
out. By contrast, a withdrawal of Japan or the Republic of Korea has quite similar predicted
impacts, mostly concentrated in East Asia. Finally, the comparison of Spain’s and Portugal’s
predicted contributions to the global diffusion of know-how shows the importance of speaking
the same language in business travel: whereas, outside Europe, Spanish business travelers fre-
quent the Spanish speaking parts of Latin America, the most notable destinations for Portuguese
business people are Brazil and Angola. Further explorations of individual countries’ contribu-
tion to the OKI can be accessed through the interactive visualizations available at https:
//growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/academic-research/business-travel.
Discussion
In spite of improving communication technologies, firms still rely heavily on business travel to
establish and maintain the international links that keep the global economy connected. Business
travel has an important impact on economic growth: countries are more likely to expand existing
and enter new industries if these industries are already well-developed in places from which
they receive most of their business travelers. However, the causal effect of business travel on
economic growth materializes through a variety of economic mechanisms, such as international
trade and investment. The dependence of trade and investment on business travel suggests that
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business travelers help establish and grow relations in ways that other forms of communication
cannot. This corroborates the hypothesis that countries rely on business travel to connect to
know-how that exists elsewhere in the world.
A different but complementary explanation of our findings is that business travel helps busi-
nesses to identify and connect to a local network of suppliers and customers. In this case,
business travel helps establish trust and share know-who embedded in personal relations rather
than know-how. We leave the question of which of these explanations provides the dominant
rationale for business travel for future research.
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, we measure business-travel mediated
knowledge spillovers only indirectly, through the relation between the growth of industries in
a destination and the most likely industrial origins of the arriving business travelers. Second,
due to the nature of our data, the estimated business travel network should be regarded as a
rough approximation of actual business travel connections. For instance, lodging and local
transportation expenses are increasingly paid through online booking and ride-sharing platforms
and therefore not captured in a traveler’s expenditures abroad. Similarly, our data predominantly
capture the know-how and know-who shared by corporations whose employees routinely use
corporate payment cards. To the extent that business travel initiated by other companies or of
employees without such cards differs, its effect will not be adequately captured in our business
travel metrics. Third, the spatial granularity of the business flows, as well as their industrial
origins, could be improved. Knowing which sectors business travelers work in and between
which cities (as opposed to countries) they travel would enrich future analyses.
However, a robust conclusion is that the network of business travel is far from egalitarian,
favoring a small number of already well-developed economies and their geographical neighbors.
This has important consequences for which countries contribute most to the global diffusion of
knowledge and which are best positioned to benefit from it. Finally, although the business
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travel network is stable in the period of our study, over longer time horizons, it is likely to
change. Moreover, the locus of the global technological frontier may shift, as it has repeatedly
throughout human history. The evolving business travel network may offer exciting ways to
analyze how such shifts percolate through the social network and face-to-face contacts between
firms. Further analysis of this network may therefore yield new insights on the development
path of the world economy.
Methods
The paper uses two main datasets: an aggregated and anonymized data set relating to corpo-
rate payment card (“card”) foreign spend, a dataset containing information on the location of
economic establishments across the world and data on global exports. The first aggregated
and anonymized dataset was made accessible, subject to strict privacy and data protection safe-
guards, by the Mastercard Center for Inclusive Growth (henceforth referred to as “the Center”),
while the second was purchased from Dun & Bradstreet. Due to the proprietary nature of the
data, we cannot make them publicly available. The third dataset is based on United Nations
Comtrade data, which can be downloaded here: http://atlas.cid.harvard.edu/
engage#data-download. In this section, we detail the characteristics of these datasets
and how we clean them to build the business travel network and vectors that describe the indus-
trial composition of national economies.
Data on indexed foreign expenditures. The business travel data are based on indexed ex-
penditures by corporate payment cards in countries other than where the cards were issued. That
is, they relate to expenditures in one country made by cards issued in another country. Below,
we will refer to a country-of-origin×country-of-destination×year combination as a data “cell”.
In data cells with less than a certain minimum threshold of recorded cards, the exact number of
card holders had been replaced by ranges (see below) – as a privacy and data protection proto-
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col. Moreover, the dollar value of expenditures was indexed, i.e., expressed in a unit-less index.
However, this index retains the relative differences between cells across years and countries of
origin as well as destination.
We accessed these data in aggregated form at the country-of-origin by country-of-destination
level and inflated to correct for variations in the data collaborator’s (undisclosed) market shares.
Because of this adjustment, the data reflect not just the indexed expenditures by payment cards
related to our data collaborator’s share of the market, but the indexed expenditures in the entire
payment market.
Note that the aforementioned indexed and aggregated expenditures include withdrawals by,
for instance, debit cards from local ATMs. This means that business travel to predominantly
cash-based economies need not be unreliably captured, as long as business travelers rely on
ATMs to withdraw local currency. Furthermore, the data are not necessarily limited to the data
collaborator’s own payment network, but include international expenditures that were cleared
by it for other card networks. However, expenditures by business travelers who use personal
instead of corporate cards will not be included. Therefore, it is important to check how rep-
resentative our estimates of global business travel compared to alternative sources on this phe-
nomenon. We provide a detailed analysis of this in Sec. S2. Moreover, the estimated business
travel flows are necessarily imperfect. Therefore, our business travel variable will be measured
with a certain amount of error. We will come back to this when discussing causal estimation in
Sec. S7.
Country List. The first cleaning operation involves the creation of a list of countries of in-
terest. The Center provided access to information on payment cards issued in 135 countries and
territories (henceforth: countries), although indexed expenditures are recorded in 236 countries.
We were allowed access to the data for one-year intervals, between 2011 and 2016. Foreign
indexed expenditures by corporate payment cards reflect the footprint of business travel that
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forms the basis of our analysis. We focus this analysis on the 135 countries that are observed
both as an origin and as a destination of such international indexed expenditures. Henceforth,
we will refer to this dataset on business travel as the BT data.
The second dataset is taken from the Dun & Bradstreet index of productive establishments
(“D&B”). The dataset lists over 120 million economic establishments across the world. For each
establishment, it records the corporate parent (if any), an estimate of the number of employees
and up to six economic activities (“industries”). We acquired the D&B dataset for the years
2011 and 2016. For the latter year, the data also contain information on the dollar value of
the establishments sales (“output”). However, output figures are only consistently available for
US establishments. In other countries, this variable is populated more erratically. Of the 135
origin/destination countries in the BT data, seven do not appear in the Dun & Bradstreet data.
The seven missing codes are:
• Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands: aggregated to the United States in the D&B dataset.
• Mongolia: not covered by D&B.
• Montenegro: aggregated to Serbia in the D&B dataset.
• Netherlands Antilles: converted into Curaćao.
• Turkmenistan: no business travel data before 2015.
• QZZ, ZAR: codes are used by the Center, but they are either outdated or custom-defined.
As a result, our final dataset includes 127 countries. Supplementary Table 1 reports the
full list. Out of these 127 countries, 96 meet the 2.5 million population threshold for the main
analyses. This list includes most of the largest economies in the world and accounts for 87% of
the world’s population and 97% of global GDP.
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Imputing Censored Cells. Our unit of observation – henceforth, “cell” – is a combination
of a country of origin, a country of destination, and a year. As a privacy and data protection
control, the Center provided us with an exact card count only in cells with more than a minimum
threshold of cards. For cells below this threshold, we just know that the number of cards falls
into one of five of predefined intervals. To still be able to use these cells in our analysis, we
impute an expected number of cards for each censored interval. We use this estimate everywhere
where data are censored.
The distribution of the number of cards per cell is heavily skewed (Supplementary Figure
1(left)). As a consequence, using the midpoint of each interval as an estimate would not be
optimal. The number-of-cards distribution is broad and exhibits a power-law with exponential
cutoff. This makes it challenging to find an accurate fit of the entire distribution of cells. How-
ever, because we are only interested in filling in the censored cells, which are located in the
head of the distribution, we can limit ourselves to small cells where the power law approxi-
mately holds.
Supplementary Figure 1(right) shows the cumulative distribution function of this subsection
of the data. Note that in the censored range, we only know the cumulative number of cards at
the end of each interval. It is easy to find a log-linear curve that accurately fits this distribution
(R2 ∼ 99.9%, F-statistic (1,27): 29270 , p < 0.001). We use this fitted curve to interpolate
how many cells will contain any of the integer-valued number of cards – ranging from 1 to the
start of the uncensored section of the distribution – and estimate the weighted average number
of cards in each of the censored intervals.
Imputing Long-Stay Cards. One complication of using corporate payment cards to un-
derstand business travel is that card holders may complete transactions en route to their final
destination. To correct for this, we aim to base our business travel network only on cards that
stayed in the country of destination for more than one day. On average, two out of three cards
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stayed only one day in their destination, meaning they were en route. This is high, but not im-
plausible. For instance, consider the case of Dubai, one of the largest transit hubs in the world
connecting Europe to Asia. In our data, 63% of trips to the Arab Emirates only stayed one
day, which we interpret as that they were connecting to go somewhere else. The real number
of connecting travelers may be somewhat higher, given that the legs of connecting flights may
fall in two consecutive days. Counting all those travelers as business people visiting the Arab
Emirates would clearly be problematic.
Due to privacy and data protection requirements, for a number of countries, we cannot
determine how many cards stayed for more than one day. Rather than dropping these countries
from the analysis – the list is long and includes countries that significantly contribute to the
world’s economy such as the Republic of Korea, Austria, Israel, Australia, Turkey, and Russia
– we decide to impute the most likely number of cards that stay for more than a day from
available data. Note that the number of rows we have to impute is high – 55% – but they
contain relatively little traffic, just 13% of the total number of trips.
To do so, we predict the number of cards staying for more than one day from the total
number of cards in the cell using a using a regression model in which the dependent and in-
dependent variables first undergo a logarithmic transformation. We fit this model for countries
for which the length-of-stay information is available. The estimated parameter is close to 1
with R2 ∼ 95% (F-statistic (1,38653): 807390, p < 0.001). Given this excellent fit, we use
this model to predict out-of-sample how many cards stayed for more than one day in the other
countries.
After making these corrections, we map the top origins and destinations of international
business travel in our sample of 127 countries (Supplementary Fig. 2). Moreover, Supplemen-
tary Fig. 3 shows the growth of global business travel in terms of indexed expenditures and
number of travelers in our data and compares this to the growth in global GDP as reported by
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the World Bank. While the indexed business travel expenditures grew by 49% and the number
of travelers by 38% between 2011 and 2016, global GDP had grown by just 3.5% in the same
period.
D&B Data. To associate business travel to the growth of industries in a country of des-
tination, we rely on the Dun & Bradstreet global industrial index (“D&B data”, http://
www.dnb.com/) retrieved in 2011 and 2016. D&B data are derived from official government
sources and direct investigation by D&B. They have worldwide coverage and have been widely
used in research on FDI (28). Ultimately, we will aggregate these data to the country-industry
level but here we describe some of the characteristics of the unaggregated data set.
For each establishment, the D&B data record their location, up to six industry codes (“SIC
codes”), as well as an estimate of the number of employees and their corporate parent organi-
zation. In the 2016 data, we also have for some establishment an estimate of the value of the
establishments’ sales output. Industries are coded at the four-digit level of the SIC87 industrial
classification system, which distinguishes among 1,005 industry codes. We consider only the
main activity of the establishment, namely the first SIC code.
We believe that this main industry code captures most of the operational know-how embed-
ded in the establishment. Moreover, the average number of SIC codes per establishment is low.
Supplementary Fig. 4 shows the distribution of the number of SIC codes per establishment:
while over 100 million establishments have only one SIC code, fewer than 20 millions have
two.
For each establishment, D&B provides either an estimate of the number of employees work-
ing in that particular physical location. Supplementary Fig. 5(left) shows that the distribution of
the number of employees per establishment is broad, spanning five orders of magnitude. For the
year 2016, we also have an estimate of the total sales value produced in an establishment – Sup-
plementary Fig. 5(right). This allows us to calculate the establishment’s productivity. However,
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sales information is mostly missing or less reliable outside the United States: Supplementary
Figure 5(right) shows that the mode of the distribution is zero. For this reason, we calculate an
industry’s average productivity using exclusively US establishments.
Data Availability
The aggregated and anonymized dataset made accessible by the Mastercard Center for Inclusive
Growth is available for the duration of this research, after which this dataset and any existing
copies will be permanently destroyed. The aggregated data used in our growth estimations,
along with the data on economic establishments (from Dun & Bradstreet), are provided as a
Supplementary Data zip file, hosted by the Mastercard Center for Inclusive Growth, which
can be reached at the URL: https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/academic-
research/business-travel. This archive contains the processed business travel net-
work as shown in Fig. 1, countries’ trade profiles as well as the number of establishments,
employment and estimated productivity by industry and country. We added random noise to the
business travel information to preserve confidential information held by the data providers. The
remaining publicly available datasets can be downloaded at http://atlas.cid.harvard.
edu/engage#data-download and at http://www.michelecoscia.com/?page_
id=1612.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1: The topology of international business travel. (A) Network representation of busi-
ness travel structure. Link width is proportional to the number of business travelers between
countries. The arrow represents the direction of the flow. Link color is proportional to the sta-
tistical significance of the connection when observed links are set against a random benchmark
in which flows are proportional to nodes’ total in- and outflows of business travelers. Node
size is proportional to the country’s economic size (GDP). Node color represents the world re-
gion in which the country is located. (B) Scattergrams representing the relationship between
the number of business travelers (always on the y axis) and six possible explanations for busi-
ness travel (top to bottom, left to right): geographical distance (red), migration (blue), foreign
direct greenfield investments (green), equity links in number of employees (purple) and estab-
lishments (brown), and trade (orange). (C) The contributors to the R2 (R2 = 73.9%, F-statistic
(9,112) = 304.9, p < 0.001) of a regression explaining the network’s connectivity by each of
those elements, as well as by the GDP of the country of origin and destination.
Figure 2: A: Visual representation of the Travel Quantity Index calculation. The color of
the flows first represents the country of origin, then the industry of origin. The width of the
flow is proportional to its intensity. B: Overrepresentation of business travelers by industry for
China, Mexico and Germany. Overrepresentation of industry i in country of destination d is
calculated as the share of business travelers attributed to industry i as a percentage of the to-
tal inflow of business travelers in country d, divided by the industry’s share in global business
travel:
TQI id/
∑
i′∈I
TQI i′d∑
d′
TQI id′/
∑
i′′∈I,d′′∈C
TQI i′′d′′
.
Figure 3: Know-how Index. A: Incoming: Map depicts the percentage by which a country’s
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economy is predicted to be larger or smaller than what we would have predicted, had its indus-
tries received their proportional share of incoming business travel. B: Outgoing: Map depicts
the percentage by which the world economy would be predicted to shrink, were the country to
stop sending business travelers abroad. (Made with Natural Earth)
Figure 4: Distribution of predicted know-how losses associated with the withdrawal of spe-
cific countries. (A) USA, (B) Germany, (C) Japan, (D) Korea, (E) Spain, (F) Portugal. (Made
with Natural Earth)
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ∆ log(#est.) ∆ log(#est.) ∆ log(#est.)
log(TQI) 0.059* 0.066 0.060
(0.016) (0.028) (0.021)
0.03 - 0.09 0.01 - 0.12 0.02 - 0.10
(0.001) (0.023) (0.005)
log(#est. in 2011) -0.033 -0.051 -0.039
(0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
-0.07 - 0.00 -0.09 - -0.01 -0.08 - 0.00
(0.071) (0.017) (0.055)
log(GDP/cap) -0.090
(0.050)
-0.19 - 0.01
(0.078)
log(pop) 0.080
(0.030)
0.02 - 0.14
(0.010)
log(#est. in ind.) 0.058
(0.031)
-0.00 - 0.12
(0.060)
country FE no no yes
industry FE no no yes
R2 0.014 0.062 0.341
# obs. 37,596 37,596 37,596
F-stat 8.9 16.0 4.6
d.o.f. F-stat (2, 95) (5, 95) (2, 95)
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.012
Statistics: Point estimate, (standard errors), 95% two-sided confidence interval, (p-value)
Standard errors two-way clustered by country and industry: * p<0.001
Table 1: Business travel and industry growth. Dependent variable: Change in the logarithm
of establishments. Independent variables: mean-reversion term (log (#est. in 2011), models 1-
3), logarithms of the country’s GDP per capita and population and logarithm of the industry’s
number of establishment worldwide (model 2), dummy variables for the country of origin and
for the country of destination (model 3). Full model results replicated in Supplementary Table
25.
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